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Abstract—An increasing amount of users’ sensitive information
is now being collected for analytics purposes. To protect users’
privacy, differential privacy has been widely studied in the
literature. Specifically, a differentially private algorithm adds noise
to the true answer of a query to generate a noisy response. As
a result, the information about the dataset leaked by the noisy
output is bounded by the privacy parameter. Oftentimes, a dataset
needs to be used for answering multiple queries (e.g., for multiple
analytics tasks), so the level of privacy protection may degrade as
more queries are answered. Thus, it is crucial to keep track of
the privacy spending which should not exceed the given privacy
budget. Moreover, if a query has been answered before and is
asked again on the same dataset, we may reuse the previous noisy
response for the current query to save the privacy cost.
In view of the above, we design and implement a blockchain-
based system for tracking and saving differential-privacy cost.
Blockchain provides a distributed immutable ledger that records
each query’s type, the noisy response used to answer each query,
the associated noise level added to the true query result, and
the remaining privacy budget in our system. As a result, the
owner of the dataset will have full knowledge about how the
dataset has been used and be confident that no new privacy cost
will be incurred for answering queries once the specified privacy
budget is exhausted. Furthermore, since the blockchain records
the noisy response used to answer each query, we also design an
algorithm to reuse previous noisy response if the same query is
asked repeatedly. Specifically, considering that different requests
of the same query may have different privacy requirements, our
algorithm (via a rigorous proof) is able to set the optimal reuse
fraction of the old noisy response and add new noise (if necessary)
to minimize the accumulated privacy cost. Experimental results
show that the proposed algorithm can reduce the privacy cost
significantly without compromising data accuracy.
We envision our system to be useful in practical applications
handling sensitive information (e.g., the Apple iOS system which
adopts differential privacy to collect user’s emoji behavior), and
to motivate more usage of blockchains.
Index Terms—Blockchain, differential privacy, data analytics,
Gaussian mechanism.
I. INTRODUCTION
Massive volumes of users’ sensitive information are being
collected for data analytics and machine learning. To protect
personal privacy, many countries have strict policies about how
technology companies collect and process users’ data. However,
the companies need to analyze users’ data for service quality
improvement. To preserve privacy while revealing useful in-
formation about datasets, differential privacy (DP) has been
proposed [1,2]. Intuitively, by incorporating some noise, the
output of an algorithm under DP will not change significantly
due to the presence or absence of one user’s information in the
dataset. Due to its introduction [1,2], DP has attracted much
interest from both academia [3]–[7] and industry [8]–[10]. For
example, Apple has incorporated DP into its mobile operating
system iOS [8]; Google has implemented a DP tool called
RAPPOR in the Chrome browser to collect information [9].
Roughly speaking, a randomized mechanism achieving
(ǫ, δ)-DP [1] means that except with a (typically small) prob-
ability δ, altering a record in a database cannot change the
probability that an output is seen by more than a multiplicative
factor eǫ. Thus, the information about the dataset leaked by
the noisy output of an (ǫ, δ)-DP algorithm is bounded by the
privacy parameters ǫ and δ. Smaller ǫ and δ mean stronger
privacy protection and less information leakage. Note that
non-zero information leakage is necessary to achieve non-zero
utility. Usually, a dataset may be used for answering multiple
queries (e.g., for multiple analytics tasks), thus accumulating
the information leakage and degrading the privacy protection
level, which can be intuitively understood as the increase
of privacy spending. Therefore, it is necessary to record the
privacy cost to prevent it from exceeding the privacy budget.
Besides, we reduce privacy cost by reusing old noisy response
to answer the current query if the query was answered before.
Traditionally, the privacy cost incurred by answering queries
on a dataset is claimed by the dataset holder. Users whose
information is in the dataset are not clear about the usage.
It is possible that privacy consumption has exceeded the pri-
vacy budget. To solve this problem, the emerging blockchain
technology provides a new solution to manage the privacy
cost. Blockchain is a chain of blocks storing cryptographic and
tamper-resistant transaction records without using a centralized
server [11,12]. With blockchain recording how the dataset
is used for answering queries, users have full knowledge of
how their information is analyzed. Users can easily access the
blockchain to check the consumption of the privacy budget. The
dataset holder has the motivation to adopt our blockchain-based
approach to provide the following accountability guarantee to
users whose information is in the dataset: if the dataset holder
uses the dataset more than the set of queries recorded by the
blockchain, measures can be taken to catch the dataset holder
with cheating because transactions written into the blockchain
are tamper-resistant.
In view of the above, we propose a blockchain-based sys-
tem to track and manage differential-privacy cost, which uses
blockchain to make the privacy spending transparent to the data
owner. Consequently, the data owner can track how dataset used
by checking blockchain transactions’ information, including
each query’s type, the noisy response used to answer each
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query, the associated noise level added to the true query result,
and the remaining privacy budget. In addition to providing
transparency of privacy management, another advantage of
our blockchain-based system is as follows. Once the specified
privacy budget is exhausted, a smart contract implemented on
the blockchain ensure that no new privacy cost will be incurred,
and this can be verified. Furthermore, since the blockchain
stores the noisy response used to answer each query, we also
design an algorithm to minimize the accumulated privacy cost
by reusing previous noisy response if the same query is asked
again. Our algorithm (via a rigorous proof) is able to set
the optimal reuse fraction of the old noisy response and add
new noise (if necessary) considering different requests of the
same query may be sent with different privacy requirements. In
our blockchain-based system, reusing noisy responses not only
saves privacy cost, but also reduces communication overhead
when the noisy response is generated without contacting the
server hosting the dataset.
The proposed system is useful for practical applications
which contain sensitive information and motivates more usage
of blockchains in the domain of privacy preservation. Further-
more, as more laws related to privacy get launched, more people
and companies will pay attention to privacy issues. Therefore,
if a company uses our proposed blockchain system to support
privacy cost and queries history tracking, it will be more reliable
and attract more users and partners.
Contributions. The major contributions of this paper are
summarized as follows:
• First, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to use the
Ethereum platform to track and reuse noise and the differential
privacy cost. Unlike traditional usage of blockchain, we design
a system that enables the smart contract to access the external
server to fetch real-world data safely without breaking the
deterministic state of the blockchain.
• Second, a novel privacy-preserving algorithm with a rigorous
mathematical proof is designed to minimize accumulated
privacy cost by reusing previous noisy responses if the same
query is received. Thus a dataset can satisfy more queries
while preventing the privacy leakage, which is essential for the
datasets with frequent queries, e.g., medical record datasets.
• Third, by combining our designed system with the algorithm,
a data owner can host datasets locally while opening access
to others in a privacy-preserving mode. Data owners can
set a privacy budget and multiple query types, and then
the blockchain smart contract will record every request, the
associated privacy cost, and the noisy response. Unlike calling
the data hosting server every time in naive solutions, our
approach reduces the number of times to request the server
significantly by taking advantage of recorded noisy results.
• Fourth, we implement the proposed system and algorithm
according to a detailed sequence diagram and conduct ex-
periments by using a real-world dataset. Numerical results
demonstrate that our proposed system and algorithm are
effective in saving the privacy cost while keeping accuracy.
Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
Section II introduces preliminaries about differential privacy
and blockchains. Section III presents system design including
our proposed noise reuse algorithm. Section IV describes chal-
lenges in implementing our system. In Section V, we discuss
experimental results to validate the effectiveness of our system.
Section VI surveys related work. Section VII concludes this
paper and identifies future directions.
Notation. Throughout the paper, P [·] denotes the probability,
and F [·] stands for the probability density function. The nota-
tion N (0, A) denotes a Gaussian random variable with zero
mean and variance A, and means a fresh Gaussian noise when
it is used to generate a noisy query response.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Differential Privacy
Differential privacy intuitively means that the adversary
cannot determine with high confidence whether the randomized
output comes from a dataset D or its neighboring dataset D′
which differs from D by one record. The formal definition of
(ǫ, δ)-differential privacy is given in Definition 1, and the notion
of neighboring datasets is discussed in Remark 2.
Definition 1 ((ǫ, δ)-Differential privacy [13]). A randomized
mechanism Y , which generates a randomized output given a
dataset as the input, achieves (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy if
P [Y (D) ∈ Y ] ≤ eǫP [Y (D′) ∈ Y] + δ, (1)
for D and D′ iterating through
all pairs of neighboring datasets, and
for Y iterating through all subsets of the output range,
where P [·] denotes the probability, and the probability space
is over the coin flips of the randomized mechanism Y .
Remark 1. The notion of (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy under δ = 0
becomes ǫ-differential privacy. ǫ-Differential privacy and (ǫ, δ)-
differential privacy is also referred to as the pure and approxi-
mate differential privacy, respectively, in many studies [3]–[5].
Remark 2 (Notion of neighboring datasets). Two datasets D
and D′ are called neighboring if they differ only in one tuple.
There are still variants about this. In the first case, the sizes
of D and D′ differ by one so that D′ is obtained by adding
one record to D or deleting one record from D. In the second
case, D and D′ have the same size (say n), and have different
records at only one of the n positions. Finally, the notion of
neighboring datasets can also be defined to include both the
cases above. Our results in this paper apply to all of the above
cases.
Among various mechanisms to achieve DP, the Gaussian
mechanism for real-valued queries proposed in [1] has received
much attention. The improved result given by [13] is Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 (Theorem A.1 by Dwork and Roth [13]). To answer
a queryQ with ℓ2-sensitivity∆Q, adding a zero-mean Gaussian
noise with standard deviation
√
2 ln 1.25
δ
× ∆Q
ǫ
(denoted by
Gaussian(∆Q, ǫ, δ) hereafter in this paper) to each dimension
of the true query result achieves (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy.
The above ℓ2-sensitivity ∆Q of a query Q is defined as the
maximal ℓ2 distance between the true query results for any
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two neighboring datasets D and D′ that differ in one record;
i.e., ∆Q = maxneighboring D,D′ ‖Q(D)−Q(D′)‖2.
More discussions on the ℓ2-sensitivity of a query are given
in Section III-G on Page 8.
B. Blockchain, Ethereum and Smart Contracts
Blockchain. The blockchain technology is popularly used in
systems requiring high security and transparency, such as Bit-
coin and Ethereum [14]. The blockchain can be effectively used
to solve the double-spending problem in Bitcoin transaction by
using a peer-to-peer network. The solution is to hash transaction
information in a chain of hash-based Proof-of-Work (PoW, used
by Bitcoin) which is the consensus mechanism algorithm used
to confirm transactions and produce new blocks to the chain.
Once the record is formed, it cannot be changed except redoing
the Proof-of-Work.
Besides, the blockchain is constantly growing with append-
ing ‘completed’ blocks. Blocks consisting of the most recent
transactions are added to the chain in chronological order [15].
Each blockchain node can have a copy of the blockchain.
The blockchain allows participants to track their transactions
without centralized control.
Ethereum. Ethereum is a blockchain platform which allows
users to create decentralized end-to-end applications [16]. The
miners in the Ethereum use the Proof-of-Work consensus algo-
rithm to complete transaction verification and synchronization.
Besides, Ethereum can run smart contracts elaborated below.
Smart Contract. The smart contract was first proposed
by Nick Szabo as a computerized transaction protocol that
can execute terms of a contract automatically [17]. It intends
to make a contract digitally, and allows to maintain credible
transactions without a third party. With the development of
blockchains, such as the Ethereum, smart contracts are stored
in the blockchain as scripts. A blockchain with a Turing-
complete programming language allows everyone to customize
smart contract scripts for transactions [18]. Smart contracts are
triggered when transactions are created or generated on the
blockchain to finishe specific tasks or services.
III. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
Our blockchain-based system provides differentially private
responses to queries while minimizing the privacy cost via
noise reuse. We design a web application to implement our
Algorithm 1, which generates noisy responses to queries with
the minimal privacy cost by setting the optimal reuse fraction
of the old noisy response and adding new noise (if necessary).
For clarity, we defer Algorithm 1 to Page 5 and its discussion
to Section III-C on Page 4. Our blockchain-based system is
illustrated in Fig. 1 and we discuss the detailed design in the
following.
A. System Architecture
Our system includes the client, the blockchain, the server,
and smart contract followed by more details as below.
Client: The primary function of the client is to transfer users’
queries to the blockchain smart contract. The client computes
the required parameter standard deviation for the server to
Miner
Miner
Miner
Miner
Smart Contract
Analysts
Client
3. Check with stored data
4. Forward request to server
if nothing to return
8. Store noisy responses
and DP requirements
6. Add noise 
to true data
2. Request
9. Noisy response
1
0
. N
o
isy
 re
sp
o
n
se
1
. Q
u
e
ry
 +
 D
P
 p
a
ra
m
e
te
rs
7. Noisy response
5. Request
Server
Fig. 1: The proposed blockchain-based system architecture for
differential-privacy cost management.
generate the Gaussian noise using the privacy parameters ǫ
and δ and forwards the query to the blockchain. Also, the client
can display the query result to the analyst after getting the noisy
response to the query.
Blockchain Smart Contract: The blockchain serves as a
middleware between the client and the server. It decides which
query should be submitted to the server. The blockchain records
the remaining privacy budget, query type, the noisy response
to answer the query, the privacy parameters, and the amount of
corresponding noise. If the remaining privacy budget is enough,
the smart contract will execute the query match function with
the recorded history. Otherwise, the smart contract will reject
this query. If the current query does not match with any query
in the history, the smart contract will call the server to calculate
the result. If the query has been received before, the blockchain
smart contract will not call the server if the noisy response can
be completely generated by old noisy answers and will call the
server if access to the dataset is still needed to generate the
noisy response.
Server: The server provides APIs to answer analysts’ queries.
When the API is called, the server will query the dataset to
calculate the respective answer. After the true value Q(D) is
calculated, the server will add noise to perturb the answer. Then
the server returns the noisy answer to the blockchain.
In the rest of the paper, we use Blockchain, Client,
and Server to denote the blockchain, client, and server,
respectively.
B. System Functionality
Match query with query history and generate noisy response:
Blockchain compares the current query type with saved
query types to retrieve previous query results. If it is the
first time for Blockchain to see the query, Blockchain
will forward the query to the server, and Server will re-
turn the perturbed result which satisfies differential privacy
to Blockchain. If the current query type matches previous
answers’ query type, Blockchainwill compare the computed
the amount of noise with all previously saved amounts of
noise under the same query type. Based on the comparison
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result, Blockchain will completely reuse old responses or
call Server.
Manage privacy budget: Blockchain updating the privacy
budget as queries are answered and the Blockchain ensures no
new privacy cost will be incurred for answering queries once
the specified privacy budget is exhausted.
C. Our Algorithm 1 based on Reusing Noise
We present our solution for reusing noise in Algorithm 1 on
Page 5. We consider real-valued queries so that the Gaussian
mechanism can be used. Extensions to non-real-valued queries
can be regarded as the future work, where we can apply the
exponential mechanism of [6].
To clarify notation use, we note that Qi means the i-th query
(ordered chronologically) and is answered by a randomized
algorithm Q˜i. A type t-query means that the query’s type is
t. Queries asked at different time can have the same query
type. This is the reason that we reuse noise in Algorithm 1.
Suppose a dataset D has been used to answer m− 1
queries Q1, Q2, . . . , Qm−1, where the i-th query Qi for i =
1, 2, . . . ,m − 1 is answered under (ǫi, δi)-differential privacy
(by reusing noise, or generating fresh noise, or combining both).
For i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, we define σi := Gaussian(∆Qi , ǫi, δi),
where ∆Qi denotes the ℓ2-sensitivity of Qi, where we defer the
discussion of ∆Qi to Section III-G on Page 8. As presented in
Algorithm 1, we have several cases discussed below. For better
understanding of these cases, we later discuss an example given
in Table I on Page 5.
Case 1): If Qm is seen for the first time, we obtain the noisy
response Q˜m(D) by adding a zero-mean Gaussian noise
with standard deviation Gaussian(∆Qm , ǫm, δm) indepen-
dently to each dimension of the true result Qm(D) (if the
privacy budget allows), as given by Line 7 of Algorithm 1,
where Gaussian(∆Qm , ǫm, δm) :=
√
2 ln 1.25
δm
× ∆Qm
ǫm
from
Lemma 1.
Case 2): If Qm has been received before, suppose Qm is
a type t-query, and among the previous m − 1 queries
Q1, Q2, . . . , Qm, let Σt consist of the corresponding noise
amounts for previous instances of type t-query; i.e., Σt :=
{σj : σj has been recorded in Blockchain and Qj is a
type t-query}.
Blockchain compares σm and the values in Σt, resulting
in the following subcases.
Case 2A): If there exists σj ∈ Σt such that σm = σj , then
Q˜m(D) is set as Q˜j(D).
Case 2B): This case considers that σm is less than min(Σt)
which denotes the minimum in Σt. Let Q˜t,min(D) denotes
the noisy response (kept in Blockchain) corresponding to
min(Σt); specifically, if min(Σt) = σj for some j, then
Q˜t,min(D) = Q˜j(D). Under σm < min(Σt), to minimize
the privacy cost, we reuse σm
2
[min(Σt)]2
fraction of noise in
Q˜t,min(D) to generate Q˜m(D) (if the privacy budget allows).
This will be obtained by Theorem 1’s Result (ii) to be
presented on Page 6. Specifically, under min(Σt) > σm,
as given by Line 22 of Algorithm 1, Q˜m(D) is set by
Q˜m(D) ← Qm(D) + σm2[min(Σt)]2 × [Q˜t,min(D) −Qm(D)] +
N (0, 1) ×
√
σm2 − σm4[min(Σt)]2 . Note that if Qm is multidi-
mensional, independent Gaussian noise will be added to each
dimension according to the above formula. This also applies
to other places of this paper.
Case 2C): This case considers that σm is greater thanmin(Σt)
and σm is different from all values in Σt. Let σℓ be the
maximal possible value in Σt that is also smaller than σm;
i.e., σℓ = max{σj : σj ∈ Σt and σj < σm}. Then Q˜m(D)
is set as Q˜ℓ(D)+N (0, 1)×
√
σm2 − σℓ2. This will become
clear by Theorem 1’s Result (ii) to be presented on Page 6.
An example to explain Algorithm 1. Table I provides an
example for better understanding of Algorithm 1. We consider
three types of queries. In particular, Q1, Q4, Q6, Q10, Q12 are
type 1-queries; Q2, Q5, Q8, Q9, Q11 are type 2-queries, and
Q3, Q7, Q13 are type 3-queries.
D. Explaining the Noise Reuse Rules of Algorithm 1
Our noise-reuse rules of Algorithm 1 are designed to min-
imize the accumulated privacy cost. To explain this, inspired
by [7], we define the privacy loss to quantify privacy cost. We
analyze the privacy loss to characterize how privacy degrades
in a fine-grained manner, instead of using the composition
theorem by Kairouz et al. [19]. Although [19] gives the state-of-
the-art results for the composition of differentially private algo-
rithms, the results do not assume the underlying mechanisms
to achieve differential privacy. In our analysis, by analyzing
the privacy loss of Gaussian mechanisms specifically, we can
obtain smaller privacy cost.
For a randomized algorithm Y , neighboring datasets D and
D′, and output y, the privacy loss LY (D,D
′; y) represents
the multiplicative difference between the probabilities that the
same output y is observed when the randomized algorithm Y
is applied to D and D′. Specifically, we define
LY (D,D
′; y) := ln
F [Y (D) = y]
F [Y (D′) = y]
, (2)
where F [·] denotes the probability density function.
For simplicity, we use probability density function F [·] in
Eq. (2) above by assuming that the randomized algorithm Y
has the continuous output. If Y has the discrete output, we
replace F [·] by probability mass function P [·].
When y follows the probability distribution of random vari-
able Y (D), LY (D,D
′; y) follows the probability distribution
of random variable LY (D,D
′;Y (D)), which we write as
LY (D,D
′) for simplicity.
We denote the composition of some randomized mechanisms
Y1, Y2, . . . , Ym for a positive integerm by Y1‖Y2‖ . . . ‖Ym. For
the composition, the privacy loss with respect to neighboring
datasetsD andD′ when the outputs of randomized mechanisms
Y1, Y2, . . . , Ym are y1, y2, . . . , ym is defined by
LY1‖Y2‖...‖Ym(D,D
′; y1, y2, . . . , ym)
:= ln
F
[ ∩mi=1 [Yi(D) = yi] ]
F
[ ∩mi=1 [Yi(D′) = yi] ] .
When yi follows the probability distribution of
random variable Yi(D) for each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m},
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Algorithm 1 Our proposed algorithm to answer the m-th query and adjust remaining privacy cost.
Input: D: dataset; Qm: the m-th query; (ǫm, δm): requested privacy parameters for query Qm;
(
√
ǫ squared remaining budget, δbudget): remaining privacy budget (at the beginning, it is (
√
ǫ squared budget, δbudget)
for ǫ squared budget = ǫbudget
2); ∆Qm : ℓ2 sensitivity of query Qm;
Output: Q˜m(D): noisy query response for query Qm on dataset D under (ǫm, δm)-differential privacy;
1: σm ← Gaussian(∆Qm , ǫm, δm); //Comment: From Lemma 1, it holds that Gaussian(∆Qm , ǫm, δm) :=
√
2 ln 1.25
δm
× ∆Qm
ǫm
.
2: if the query Qm is seen for the first time then
3: Client computes ǫ squared cost such that Gaussian(∆Qm ,
√
ǫ squared cost, δbudget) = σm;
4: //Comment: This means
√
2 ln 1.25
δbudget
× ∆Qm√
ǫ squared cost
= σm, where σm as Gaussian(∆Qm , ǫm, δm) is
√
2 ln 1.25
δm
× ∆Qm
ǫm
.
5: Client computes ǫ squared remaining budget← ǫ squared remaining budget− ǫ squared cost;
6: if ǫ squared remaining budget ≥ 0 then
7: return Q˜m(D)← Qm(D)+N (0, 1)×σm; //Comment: We refer to this Case 1) on Page 4. If Qm is multidimensional,
independent Gaussian noise will be added to each dimension.
8: Blockchain records 〈Qm’s query type, ǫm, δm, σm, Q˜m(D)〉; //Comment: This information will be kept together with
a cryptographic hash of the dataset D, which Blockchain stores so it knows which records are for the same dataset
D.
9: else
10: return an error of insufficient privacy budget;
11: end if
12: else
13: Suppose Qm is a type t-query. Blockchain compares σm with values in Σt := {σj : σj has been recorded in
Blockchain and Qj is a type t-query} (i.e., Σt consists of the corresponding noise amounts for previous instances of
type t-query), resulting in the following subcases.
14: if there exists σj ∈ Σt such that σm = σj then
15: Blockchain returns Q˜m(D)← Q˜j(D); //Comment: We refer to this Case 2A) on Page 4.
16: else if σm < min(Σt) then
17: //Comment: The case of partially reusing an old noise:
18: Client computes ǫ squared cost such that [Gaussian(∆Qm ,
√
ǫ squared cost, δbudget)]
−2 = σm
−2 − [min(Σt)]−2;
19: Client computes ǫ squared remaining budget← ǫ squared remaining budget− ǫ squared cost;
20: if ǫ squared remaining budget ≥ 0 then
21: Blockchain computes NoiseReuseRatio← σm2[min(Σt)]2 and AdditionalNoise← N (0, 1)×
√
σm2 − σm4[min(Σt)]2
22: Blockchain contacts Server to compute
Q˜m(D) ← Qm(D) + NoiseReuseRatio × [Q˜t,min(D) − Qm(D)] + AdditionalNoise, where Q˜t,min(D) denotes the
noisy response (kept in Blockchain) corresponding to min(Σt); //Comment: We refer to this Case 2B) on Page 4.
23: Blockchain records 〈Qm’s query type, ǫm, δm, σm, Q˜m(D)〉;
24: else
25: return an error of insufficient privacy budget;
26: end if
27: else
28: //Comment: The case of fully reusing an old noise:
29: With σℓ denoting the maximal possible value in Σt that is also smaller than σm, Blockchain reuses Q˜ℓ(D), which
denotes the noisy response (kept in Blockchain) corresponding to σℓ;
30: Blockchain computes Q˜m(D)← Q˜ℓ(D)+N (0, 1)×
√
σm2 − σℓ2; //Comment: We refer to this Case 2C) on Page 4.
31: Blockchain records 〈Qm’s query type, ǫm, δm, σm, Q˜m(D)〉;
32: end if
33: end if
Table I: An example to explain Algorithm 1.
Qm’s query typeQ1=type-1 Q2=type-2 Q3=type-3 Q4=type-1 Q5=type-2 Q6=type-1Q7=type-3 Q8=type-2 Q9=type-2Q10=type-1Q11=type-2Q12=type-1Q13=type-3
σm computed by
Line 1 of Alg. 1
σ1 = 1 σ2 = 3 σ3 = 2 σ4 = 2.5 σ5 = 2 σ6 = 0.5 σ7 = 2 σ8 = 2.5 σ9 = 1.5 σ10 = 0.25 σ11 = 1 σ12 = 0.75 σ13 = 1.5
Case involved
in Alg. 1
1):Q˜1←Q1
+
N (0,1)×σ1
with
accessingD
1):Q˜2←Q2
+
N (0,1)×σ2
with
accessingD
1):Q˜3←Q3
+
N (0,1)×σ3
with
accessingD
2C): Q˜4
reuses Q˜1
without
accessingD
2B): Q˜5
reuses Q˜2
with
accessingD
2B): Q˜6
reuses Q˜1
with
accessingD
2A): Q˜7
reuses Q˜3
without
accessingD
2C): Q˜8
reuses Q˜5
without
accessingD
2B): Q˜9
reuses Q˜5
with
accessingD
2B): Q˜10
reuses Q˜6
with
accessingD
2B): Q˜11
reuses Q˜9
with
accessingD
2C): Q˜12
reuses Q˜6
without
accessingD
2B): Q˜13
reuses Q˜7
with
accessingD
clearly LY1‖Y2‖...‖Ym(D,D
′; y1, y2, . . . , ym) follows
the probability distribution of random variable
LY1‖Y2‖...‖Ym(D,D
′;Y1(D), Y2(D), . . . , Ym(D)), which
we write as LY1‖Y2‖...‖Ym(D,D
′) for simplicity.
With the privacy loss defined above, we now analyze how
to reuse noise when a series of queries are answered under
differential privacy. To this end, we present Theorem 1, which
presents the optimal ratio of reusing noise to minimize privacy
cost.
Theorem 1 (Optimal ratio of reusing noise to mini-
mize privacy cost). Suppose that before answering query
Qm and after answering Q1, Q2, . . . , Qm−1, the privacy loss
L
Q˜1‖Q˜2‖...‖Q˜m−1
(D,D′) is given by N (A(D,D′)2 , A(D,D′))
for some A(D,D′). For the m-th query Qm, suppose that Qm
is the same as Qj for some j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m−1} and we reuse
r fraction of noise in Q˜j(D) to generate Q˜m(D) for 0 ≤ r ≤ 1
satisfying σm
2−r2σj2 > 0, where r is a constant to be decided.
If Q˜j(D)−Qj(D) follows a Gaussian probability distribution
with mean 0 and standard deviation σj , we generate the noisy
response Q˜m(D) to answer query Qm as follows:
Q˜m(D)
← Qm(D) + r[Q˜j(D)−Qj(D)] +N (0, σm2 − r2σj2),
(3)
so that Q˜m(D) − Qm(D) follows a Gaussian probability
distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation σm.
Note that ∆Qm and ∆Qj are the same since Qm and Qj
are the same. Then we have the following results.
(i) After answering the m queries Q1, Q2, . . . , Qm, the privacy
loss L
Q˜1‖Q˜2‖...‖Q˜m
(D,D′) will be N (Br(D,D′)2 , Br(D,D′))
for Br(D,D
′) := A(D,D′) + [‖Qm(D)−Qm(D
′)‖2]
2(1−r)2
σm2−r2σj2
.
(ii) We clearly require r ≥ 0 and σm2 − r2σj2 ≥ 0 in (3)
above (note that N (0, 0) ≡ 0). To minimize the total privacy
cost (which is equivalent to minimize Br(D,D
′) above), the
optimal r is given by
roptimal =
{
1, if σm ≥ σj ,(
σm
σj
)2
, if σm < σj ,
(4)
so that substituting Eq. (4) into the expression of Br(D,D
′)
gives
Broptimal(D,D
′)
=

A(D,D′), if σm ≥ σj ;
A(D,D′) + [‖Qm(D) −Qm(D′)‖2]2
(
1
σm2
− 1
σj2
)
,
if σm < σj .
(5)
Note that if σm = σj for some j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m−1}, we have
roptimal = 1 and just set Q˜m(D) as Q˜j(D).
Proof. The proof is in Appendix A of the online full ver-
sion [20] (i.e., this paper).
Eq. (4) of Theorem 1 clearly indicates the noise use ratio
σm
2
[min(Σt)]2
of Case 2B) in Algorithm 1 (see Line 22 of Algo-
rithm 1), and the noise use ratio 1 of Cases 2A) and 2C) in
Algorithm 1 (see Lines 15 and 30 of Algorithm 1).
By considering r = 0 in Result (i) of Theorem 1, we obtain
Corollary 1, which presents the classical result on the privacy
loss of a single run of the Gaussian mechanism.
Corollary 1. By consideringm = 1 in Result (i) of Theorem 1,
we have that for a randomized algorithm Q˜ which adds
Gaussian noise amount σ to a query Q, the privacy loss
with respect to neighboring datasets D and D′ is given by
N (A(D,D′)2 , A(D,D′)) for A(D,D′) := [‖Q(D)−Q(D
′)‖2]
2
σ2
.
Corollary 1 has been shown in many prior studies [3,4,13]
on the Gaussian mechanism for differential privacy.
By considering r = 0 in Result (i) of Theorem 1, we
obtain Corollary 2, which presents the privacy loss of the naive
algorithm where the noisy response to each query is generated
independently using fresh noise.
Corollary 2 (Privacy loss of the naive algorithm where
each query is answered independently). Suppose a dataset
has been used to answer n queries Q1, Q2, . . . , Qn under
differential privacy. Specifically, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, to answer
the i-th query Qi under (ǫi, δi)-differential privacy, a noisy
response Q˜i is generated by adding independent Gaussian
noise σi := Gaussian(∆Qi , ǫi, δi) to the true query result
Qi, where ∆Qi is the ℓ2-sensitivity of Qi. Then after an-
swering n queries Q1, Q2, . . . , Qn independently as above,
the privacy loss with respect to neighboring datasets D and
D′ is given by N (F (D,D′)2 , F (D,D′)) for F (D,D′) :=∑n
i=1
[‖Qi(D)−Qi(D
′)‖2]
2
σi2
.
E. Explaining Privacy Cost Update in Algorithm 1
Among the above cases, Cases 2A) and 2C) do not incur
additional privacy cost since they just use previous noisy results
and generate fresh Gaussian noise, without accessing to the
datasetD. In contrast, Cases 1) and 2B) incur additional privacy
cost since they need to access the dataset D to compute the true
query result Qm(D). Hence, in Algorithm 1, the privacy cost
is updated in Cases 1) and 2B), but not in Cases 2A) and 2C).
In this section, we explain the reason that the privacy cost is
updated in Algorithm 1 according to Lines 3 and 5 for Case 1),
and Lines 18 and 19 for Case 2B).
When our Algorithm 1 is used, we let the above ran-
domized mechanism Yi be our noisy response function Q˜i.
When Q˜1, Q˜2, . . . , Q˜i−1 on dataset D are instantiated as
y1, y2, . . . , yi−1, if the generation of Q˜i on dataset D uses
Q˜j for some j < i, then the auxiliary information auxi
in the input to Q˜i contains yj (aux1 is ∅). For the con-
secutive use of our Algorithm 1, it will become clear that
the privacy loss, defined by L
Q˜1,Q˜2,...,Q˜m
(y1, y2, . . . , ym) :=
lnmaxneighboring datasets D,D′
F[∩mi=1[Q˜i(D)=yi]]
F[∩mi=1[Q˜i(D′)=yi]]
, follows a Gaus-
sian probability distribution with mean V2 and variance V for
some V , denoted by N (V2 , V ). For such a reason that form
of privacy loss, the corresponding differential-privacy level is
given by the following lemma.
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Lemma 2. If the privacy loss of a randomized mecha-
nism Y with respect to neighboring datasets D and D′ is
given by N (V (D,D′)2 , V (D,D′)) for some V (D,D′), then
Y achieves (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy for ǫ and δ satisfying
maxneighboring datasets D,D′ V (D,D
′) = [Gaussian(1, ǫ, δ)]−2.
Proof. The proof details are in Appendix B of the online full
version [20] (i.e., this paper).
Based on the privacy loss defined above, we have the fol-
lowing theorem which explains the rules to update the privacy
cost in our Algorithm 1.
Theorem 2. We consider the consecutive use of Algo-
rithm 1 here. Suppose that after answering Q1, Q2, . . . , Qm−1
and before answering query Qm, the privacy loss with
respect to neighboring datasets D and D′ is given by
N (A(D,D′)2 , A(D,D′)) for some A(D,D′), and the corre-
sponding privacy level can be given by (ǫold, δbudget)-differential
privacy. Then in Algorithm 1, after answering all m queries
Q1, Q2, . . . , Qm−1, Qm, we have:
• the privacy loss with respect to neighboring datasets D and
D′
① will still be N (A(D,D′)2 , A(D,D′)) in Cases 2A) and 2C),
② will be N (B(D,D′)2 , B(D,D′)) in Case 1) for B(D,D′) :=
A(D,D′) + [‖Qm(D)−Qm(D
′)‖2]
2
σm2
,
③ will be N (C(D,D′)2 , C(D,D′)) in Case 2B) for C(D,D′) :=
A(D,D′)+ [‖Qm(D)−Qm(D′)‖2]2×
[
1
σm2
− 1[min(Σt)]2
]
;
• the corresponding privacy level can be given by (ǫnew, δbudget)-
differential privacy with the following ǫnew:
④ ǫnew = ǫold in Cases 2A) and 2C),
⑤ ǫnew
2 = ǫold
2+ǫ squared cost in Case 1) for ǫ squared cost
satisfying Gaussian(∆Qm ,
√
ǫ squared cost, δbudget) = σm,
⑥ ǫnew
2 = ǫold
2 + ǫ squared cost in
Case 2B) for ǫ squared cost satisfying
[Gaussian(∆Qm ,
√
ǫ squared cost, δbudget)]
−2 =
σm
−2 − [min(Σt)]−2.
Theorem 2 explains the rules to update the privacy cost in
Algorithm 1. Specifically, Result ⑤ gives Lines 3 and 5 for
Case 1), and Result ⑥ gives Lines 18 and 19 for Case 2B).
Proof. The proof is in Appendix C of the online full ver-
sion [20] (i.e., this paper).
F. Analyzing the Total Privacy Cost
Based on Theorem 2, we now analyze the total privacy cost
when our system calls Algorithm 1 consecutively.
At the beginning when no query has been answered, we
have V = 0 (note that N (0, 0) ≡ 0). Then by induction
via Corollary 1 and Theorem 2, for the consecutive use of
Algorithm 1, the privacy loss is always in the form of N (V2 , V )
for some V . In our Algorithm 1, the privacy loss changes only
when the query being answered belongs to Cases 1) and 2B).
More formally, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Among queries Q1, Q2, · · · , Qn, let N1, N2A,
N2B , and N2C be the set of i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} such that Qi
is in Cases 1), 2A), 2B), and 2C), respectively. For queries
in Case 2B), let T2B be the set of query types. In Case 2B),
for query type t ∈ T2B, suppose the number of type-t queries
be mt, and let these type-t queries be Qjt,1 , Qjt,2 , . . . , Qjt,mt
for indices jt,1, jt,2, . . . , jt,mt (ordered chronologically) all
belonging to N2B . From Case 2B) of Algorithm 1, we have
σjt,1 > σjt,2 > . . . > σjt,mt , and for k ∈ {2, 3, . . . ,mt},
Q˜jt,k is answered by reusing
σjt,k
2
σjt,k−1
2 fraction of old noise in
Q˜jt,k−1 ; more specifically, Q˜jt,k = Qjt,k +
σjt,k
2
σjt,k−1
2 [Q˜jt,k−1 −
Qjt,k−1 ]+N (0, σjt,k2−
σjt,k
4
σjt,k−1
2 ) from Line 22 of Algorithm 1
on Page 5 for Case 2B). We also consider that Q˜jt,1 is answered
by reusing
σjt,1
2
σjt,0
2 fraction of old noise in Q˜jt,0 . Let the ℓ2-
sensitivity of a type-t query be ∆(type-t).
In the example provided in Table I, we have N1 = {1, 2, 3},
N2A = {7}, N2B = {5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 13}, and N2C = {8, 12}.
T2B = {type-1, type-2, type-3}. In Case 2B), the number of
type-1 queries is m1 = 2, and these type-1 queries are Q6
and Q10 so j1,1 = 6 and j1,2 = 10 (also j1,0 = 1 since Q˜6
reuses Q˜1); the number of type-2 queries is m2 = 3, and these
type-2 queries are Q5, Q9, and Q11 so j2,1 = 5 and j2,2 = 9,
j2,3 = 11 (also j2,0 = 2 since Q˜5 reuses Q˜2); the number
of type-3 queries is m3 = 1, and this type-3 query is Q13 so
j3,1 = 13 (also j3,0 = 3 since Q˜13 reuses Q˜3).
Then after Algorithm 1 is used to answer all n queries with
query Qi being answered under (ǫi, δi)-differential privacy, we
have:
• The total privacy loss with respect to neighboring datasets D
and D′ is given by N (G(D,D′)2 , G(D,D′)), where
G(D,D′) :=
∑
i∈N1
[‖Qi(D)−Qi(D′)‖2]2
σi2
+
∑
t∈T2B
{
[‖Qjt,mt (D)−Qjt,mt (D′)‖2]
2
σjt,mt
2
− [‖Qjt,0(D)−Qjt,0(D
′)‖2]2
σjt,0
2
}
, (6)
and the first summation is the contribution from queries
in Case 1), and the second summation is the contribution
from queries in Case 2B). When D and D′ iterate the
space of neighboring datasets, the maximum of ‖Qi(D) −
Qi(D
′)‖ is Qi’s ℓ2-sensitivity ∆Qi , and the maximum of both
‖Qjt,mt (D)−Qjt,mt (D′)‖2 and ‖Qjt,0(D)−Qjt,0 (D′)‖2 are
∆(type-t) since Qjt,mt and Qjt,0 are both type-t queries, we
obtain
max
neighboring datasets D,D′
G(D,D′)
=
∑
i∈N1
∆Qi
2
σi2
+
∑
t∈T2B
[
[∆(type-t)]
2
σjt,mt
2
− [∆(type-t)]
2
σjt,0
2
]
. (7)
In the example provided in Table I on Page 5,
maxneighboring datasets D,D′ G(D,D
′) is given by
∆Q1
2
σ12
+
∆Q2
2
σ22
+
∆Q3
2
σ32
+
[
[∆(type-1)]2
σ102
− [∆(type-1)]2
σ12
]
+
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[
[∆(type-2)]2
σ112
− [∆(type-2)]2
σ22
]
+
[
[∆(type-3)]2
σ132
− [∆(type-3)]2
σ32
]
=
[∆(type-1)]2
σ102
+ [∆(type-2)]
2
σ112
+ [∆(type-3)]
2
σ132
.
• From Lemma 2, the total privacy cost of our Algorithm 1
can be given by (ǫours, δbudget)-differential privacy for ǫours
satisfying
[Gaussian(1, ǫours, δbudget)]
−2 = max
neighboring datasets D,D′
G(D,D′),
(8)
or (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy for any ǫ and δ satisfying
[Gaussian(1, ǫ, δ)]−2 = maxneighboring datasets D,D′ G(D,D
′).
Proof. The proof is in Appendix D of the online full ver-
sion [20] (i.e., this paper).
Remark 3. Theorem 3 can be used to understand
that our Algorithm 1 incurs less privacy cost than
that of the naive algorithm where n queries are
answered independently. As given in Corollary 2,
the privacy loss with respect to neighboring datasets
D and D′ is given by N (F (D,D′)2 , F (D,D′)) for
F (D,D′) :=
∑n
i=1
[‖Qi(D)−Qi(D
′)‖2]
2
σi2
. Clearly,
F (D,D′) ≥ G(D,D′) for G(D,D′) given by Eq. (6)
above. From Lemma 2, the privacy cost of the naive
algorithm can be given by (ǫnaive, δbudget)-differential
privacy for ǫnaive satisfying [Gaussian(1, ǫnaive, δbudget)]
−2 =
maxneighboring datasets D,D′ F (D,D
′), which with Eq. (8) in
Theorem 3 and the expression of Gaussian(·, ·, ·) in Lemma 1
implies ǫours
ǫnaive
=
√
max
neighboring datasets D,D′
G(D,D′)
max
neighboring datasets D,D′
F (D,D′) ≤ 1 , where the
equal sign is taken only when all n queries are different so no
noise reuse is incurred in our Algorithm 1.
G. Computing the ℓ2-sensitivity of A Query
The ℓ2-sensitivity of a query Q is defined as the max-
imal ℓ2 distance between the (true) query results for any
neighboring datasets D and D′ that differ in one record:
∆Q = maxneighboring datasets D,D′ ‖Q(D)−Q(D′)‖2. For one-
dimensional real-valued query Q, ∆Q is simply the maxi-
mal absolute difference between Q(D) and Q(D′) for any
neighboring datasets D and D′. In Section V for performance
evaluation, we define neighboring datasets by considering mod-
ifying an entry. Then if the dataset has n users’ information,
and the domain of each user’s income is within the interval
[min income,max income], then ∆Q for query Q being the
average income of all users is max income−min income
n
since this
is the maximal variation in the output when a user’s record
changes. Similarly, ∆Q for query Q being the percentage of
female users is 1
n
.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES OF OUR
BLOCKCHAIN-BASED SYSTEM
We now discuss challenges and countermeasures during the
design and implementation of our blockchain-based system.
Smart Contract fetches external data. Ethereum blockchain
applications, such as Bitcoin scripts and smart contracts are
unable to access and fetch directly the external data they need.
However, in our application, Blockchain needs to fetch data
alt
:Client :Server
Analysts
2. query(queryName,
 privacyParams)
3. getRemainingBudget()
4. return
7. return stored noisy result
else
8. return9. return
:UI
1.start
10. return
:Smart Contract
6. isStored(queryName, sigma)
7.getNoisyResponse(queryName, oldSigma, 
sigma, guassianRandom)
isStored==true&&sigma>=existingSigma
5. getQueryResult(queryName, sigma,
 guassianRandom)
8. return
Fig. 2: The proposed blockchain-based system working flow
for differential-privacy cost management.
from Server then returns them to Client. This requires
smart contract to send the HTTP POST request. Hence, we use
the Provable, a service integrated with a number of blockchain
protocols and can be accessed by non-blockchain applications
as well. It guarantees that data fetched from the original data-
source is genuine and untampered.
By using the Provable, smart contracts can directly access
data from web sites or APIs. In our case, Blockchain can
send HTTP requests to Server with parameters, and then
process and store data after Server responds successfully.
Mathematical operations with Solidity. Blockchain is
written using solidity language which is designed to target the
Ethereum Virtual Machine. However, current solidity language
does not have inherent functions for complex mathematical
operations, such as taking the square root or logarithm. We
write a function to implement the square root operation. To
avoid using Lemma 1 to compute logarithm in Blockchain,
we generate Gaussian noise in Client, and pass the value
to Blockchain as one of the parameters in function Query-
Match. Besides, current Solidity version cannot operate float or
double type data. To keep the precision, we scale up the noise
amount during calculation, and then scale down the value before
returning the noisy data to analysts.
V. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we perform experiments to validate the
proposed system and algorithm are effective in saving privacy
cost according to the system flow shown in Fig. 2. More
specifically, a user sends a query through the UI, and then
Client receives the query and forwards it to Blockchain
smart contract. After the smart contract checks with stored data,
it will decide whether to return the noisy response to Client
directly or forward the request to Server. If Server receives
the request, it will generate and return a noisy response to the
smart contract.
A. Experiment Setup
We prototype a web application based on the system descrip-
tion in Section III. We use the Javascript language to write
Client, whereas the Solidity language is for Blockchain
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Fig. 3: Performance comparison of the sum of privacy cost.
smart contract. Besides, Web3 is used as the Javascript API
to exchange information between Client and Blockchain
smart contract, and then Node.js and express web framework
are leveraged to set up Server. In addition, MongoDB is used
as the database to host the real-world dataset. Our designed
smart contracts are deployed on the Ropsten [21] testnet with
the MetaMask extension of the Chrome browser. The Ropsten
testnet is a testing blockchain environment maintained by
Ethereum, and it implements the same Proof-of-Work protocol
as the main Ethereum network.
We evaluate the performance of the proposed differential
privacy mechanism based on a real-world dataset containing
American community survey samples extracted from the Inte-
grated Public Use Microdata Series at https://www.ipums.org.
There are 5000 records in the dataset. Each record includes the
following numerical attributes: “Total personal income”, “Total
family income”, “Age”, and categorical attributes: “Race”,
“Citizenship status”. We consider five types of queries: “average
personal income”, “average total family income”, “frequency
of US citizens”, “frequency of white race”, and “frequency
of age more than 60”. The sensitivities of these queries are
141, 277, 0.2, 0.2, and 0.2, respectively. More details about the
sensitivity computation of a query are given in Section III-G.
We set the privacy budget as ǫbudget = 8 and δbudget = 10
−4. For
the privacy parameter of each queryQi, we sample ǫi uniformly
from [0.1, 1.1] and sample δi uniformly from [10
−5, 10−4].
B. Experimental Results
The benchmark of our experiment is a naive scheme which
does not contain the Algorithm 1 in the smart contract. That is,
every query will be forwarded by the smart contract to Server
to get the noisy response. Hence, no differential privacy cost
can be reused in the naive scheme.
First, we use an experiment to validate that our proposed
Algorithm 1 is effective in saving privacy cost. Thus, we design
a performance comparison experiment by tracking privacy cost
using our Algorithm 1 and the naive scheme, respectively.
Specifically, we deploy two smart contracts implementing our
Algorithm 1 and the naive scheme on the Ropsten testnet,
respectively. Then, we send 150 requests randomly selected
in five query types from Client of the web application, and
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Fig. 4: Performance comparison of the sum of relative error.
record the privacy cost of each query. As shown in Fig. 3,
compared with the naive scheme, the proposed algorithm saves
significant privacy cost. When the number of the queries is
150, the differential-privacy cost of Algorithm 1 is about 52%
less than that of the naive algorithm. We also observe that the
privacy cost in the proposed scheme increases slowly when
the number of queries increases, even trending to converge to
a specific value. The reason is that, in Algorithm 1, for each
query type, we can always partially or fully reuse previous
noisy answers when the query type is asked for a second time
or more. Therefore, in our scheme, many queries are answered
without incurring additional privacy cost if noisy responses
fully reuse previous noisy answers.
Second, to prove that the proposed Algorithm 1 retains
the accuracy of the dataset, we design another experiment to
compare the sum of relative errors. We use the same smart
contracts as those in the last experiment. We accumulate relative
errors incurred in each query. Fig. 4 shows that the sum of
relative errors of the Algorithm 1 is comparable with that of
the naive scheme. Since relative errors are similar between two
schemes, our results demonstrate that the proposed Algorithm 1
keeps the accuracy.
As a summary, Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 together demonstrate that
our Algorithm 1 can save privacy cost significantly without
sacrificing the accuracy of the dataset.
VI. RELATED WORK
In this section, we first compare our paper and a closely
related study [22], and then discuss other related work.
A. Comparison with Yang et al. [22]
Note that Yang et al. [22] utilized blockchain and differential
privacy technologies to achieve the security and privacy protec-
tion during data sharing. Compared with [22], we summarize
the differences between our work and [22] as follows.
• Although Algorithm 1 of [22] claims to satisfy ǫ-differential
privacy, it does not since the noisy output’s domain (i.e.,
the set of all possible values) depends on the input. The
explanation is as follows. In [22], for two neighboring datasets
D and D′, there exists a subset Y of outputs such that
P
[
Q˜(D) ∈ Y
]
> 0 but P
[
Q˜(D′) ∈ Y
]
= 0. This means
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P[Q˜(D)∈Y]
P[Q˜(D′)∈Y]
= ∞ > eǫ, which violates ǫ-differential privacy
for any ǫ <∞.
• [22] assumes the same privacy parameter for all queries.
• [22] does not discuss how to choose the small additional
privacy parameter in its Algorithm 1.
• In [22], when a query is asked for the first time, the Laplace
mechanism of [2] for ǫ-differential privacy is used to add
Laplace noise to the true query result. Afterwards, [22] adds
new Laplacian noise on previous noisy output, which makes
the new noisy response no longer follow Laplace distribution
since the sum of independent Laplace random variables does
not follow a Laplace distribution. Hence, the analysis in [22]
is not effective.
We consider (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy by using the Gaussian
noise. The advantage of Gaussian noise over Laplace noise lies
in the easier privacy analysis for the composition of different
privacy-preserving algorithms, since the sum of independent
Gaussian random variables still follows the Gaussian distribu-
tion, while the sum of independent Laplace random variables
does not obey a Laplace distribution.
B. Other Related Work
Differential privacy, a strong mathematical model to guar-
antee the database’s privacy, has attracted much attention in
recent years. Blockchain is a fast-growing technology to pro-
vide security and privacy in a decentralized manner [12,23]–
[26]. Feng et al. [27] summarized prior studies about privacy
protection in blockchain system, including methodology for
identity and transaction privacy preservation. In the following,
we will introduce more recent studies utilizing blockchain or
privacy techniques to provide privacy or security protection in
identity, data, and transactions.
Leveraging Blockchains for Identity Privacy/Security
Protection. A few studies have focused on leveraging the
blockchain to guarantee privacy/security in access control man-
agement or identity protection. For example, Zyskind et al. [28]
and Xia et al. [29] both used blockchain in access control
management. Zyskind et al. [28] created a decentralized per-
sonal data management system to address users’ concerns about
privacy when using third-party mobile platforms. Xia et al. [29]
proposed a permissioned blockchain-based data sharing frame-
work to allow only verified users to access the cloud data.
Lu et al. [30] developed a private and anonymous decen-
tralized crowdsourcing system ZebraLancer, which overcame
data leakage and identity breach in traditional decentralized
crowdsourcing. The above studies focused on identity privacy
because the Blockchain is anonymous, whereas they did not
consider the privacy protection for the database.
Leveraging Blockchains for Data Privacy/Security Pro-
tection. In addition to the identity privacy preservation,
Hu et al. [31] replaced the central server with a smart con-
tract and constructed a decentralized privacy-preserving search
scheme for computing encrypted data while ensuring the pri-
vacy of data to prevent from misbehavings of a malicious
centralized server. Luongo et al. [32] used secure multi-party
computation to design a privacy primitive named Keep which
allows contracts to manage and use private data without ex-
posing the data to the public blockchain for protecting smart
contracts on public blockchains. Alternatively, we use the
differential privacy standard to guarantee privacy. Moreover,
blockchains are popular to be used for security protection of
data sharing in IoT scenarios [23,24,29].
Leveraging Blockchains for Transaction Privacy/Security
Protection. Moreover, some previous studies used blockchain
to guarantee security and privacy in transactions. For example,
Henry et al. [11] proposed that the blockchain should use
mechanisms that piggyback on the overlay network, which was
ready for announcing transactions to de-link users’ network-
level information instead of using an external service such as
Tor to protect users’ privacy. Gervais [33] proposed a quanti-
tative framework to analyze the security of Proof-of-Work in
blockchains, where the framework’s inputs included security,
consensus, and network parameters. Herrera-Joancomartı´ and
Pe´rez-Sola` [34] focused on privacy in bitcoin transactions.
Sani et al. [35] proposed a new blockchain Xyreum with
high-performance and scalability to secure transactions in the
Industrial Internet of Things.
Reusing Noisy Answers in Differentially Private Al-
gorithms. Some differential privacy algorithms reusing
noisy answers were proposed to provide privacy protection.
Xiao et al. [36] proposed an algorithm to correlate the Lapalce
noise added to different queries to improve the overall accuracy.
Given a series of counting queries, the mechanism proposed
by Li and Miklau [37] selected a subset of queries to answer
privately and used their noisy answers to derive answers for
the remaining queries. For a set of non-overlapping counting
queries, Kellaris and Papadopoulos et al. [38] pre-processed the
counts by elaborate grouping and smoothing them via averaging
to reduce the sensitivity and thus the amount of injected noise.
Given a workload of queries, Yaroslavtsev et al. [39] introduced
a solution to balance accuracy and efficiency by answering
some queries more accurately than others.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this paper, we use a blockchain-based approach for
tracking and saving differential-privacy cost. In our design, we
propose an algorithm that reuses noise fully or partially for
different instances of the same query type to minimize the ac-
cumulated privacy cost. The algorithm is proved the efficiency
via a rigorous mathematical proof. Moreover, we design a
blockchain-based system for conducting real-world experiments
to confirm the effectiveness of the proposed approach.
A future direction is that for different but correlated queries,
we will investigate how to reuse answers between them.
In addition, our system is currently implemented based on
Ethereum. To enable more extensions, we will implement our
system using the Hyperledger Fabric whose smart contract
code supports more sophisticated operations compared with
Ethereum. Moreover, Ethereum 2.0 is expected to launch in
2020, which will equip with the Proof-of-Stake consensus
mechanism [40]. Then we will upgrade our algorithm and
system design to be compatible with new features.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. (i) Q˜i is zero-mean Gaussian random variables with
variance σ2i , privacy loss satisfies N(0, σ
2
i ). After answering
Q1, Q2, . . . , Qm−1, the privacy loss LQ˜1‖Q˜2‖...‖Q˜m−1(D,D
′)
is given by N (A(D,D′)2 , A(D,D′)) as stated in Theorem 1.
When Q˜j(D) and Q˜m(D) take yj and ym respectively,
Q˜j(D)−Qj(D) and Q˜m(D)−Qm(D)− r[Q˜j(D)−Qj(D)]
take the following defined gj and gm respectively:
gj := yj −Qj(D), (9)
gm := ym −Qm(D)− r[yj −Qj(D)]. (10)
For D′ being a neighboring dataset of D, we further define
hj := Qj(D)−Qj(D′), (11)
hm := Qm(D)−Qm(D′), (12)
so that
gj + hj = yj −Qj(D′), (13)
gm + hm − rhj = ym −Qm(D′)− r[yj −Qj(D′)]. (14)
Note that hj and hm are the same since Qj and Qm are the
same. From the above analysis, we obtain :
F
[
Q˜m(D) = ym | Q˜j(D) = yj
]
= F
[
Q˜m(D)−Qm(D)− r[Q˜j(D)−Qj(D)] = gm
| Q˜j(D) = yj
]
(b)
=
1√
2π(σm2 − r2σj2)
e
− gm
2
2(σm2−r2σj
2) , (15)
where step (b) follows since where Q˜j(D) − Qj(D) is a
zero-mean Gaussian random variable with variance σ2j and
Q˜m(D)−Qm(D) − r[Q˜j(D)−Qj(D)] is a zero-mean Gaus-
sian random variable with variance σm
2 − r2σj2.
Similarly, for dataset D′, we have :
F
[
Q˜m(D
′) = ym | Q˜j(D′) = yj
]
= F
 Q˜m(D′)−Qm(D′)− r[Q˜j(D′)−Qj(D′)]= gm + hm − rhj
| Q˜j(D′) = yj

(b)
=
1√
2π(σm2 − r2σj2)
e
−
(gm+hm−rhj )
2
2(σm2−r2σj
2) , (16)
where step (b) follows since where Q˜j(D
′) − Qj(D′)
is a Gaussian random variable with variance σ2j and
Q˜m(D
′)−Qm(D′)− r[Q˜j(D′)−Qj(D′) is a zero-mean
Gaussian random variable with variance σm
2 − r2σj2.
Then,
ln
F
[
Q˜m(D) = ym | Q˜j(D) = yj
]
F
[
Q˜m(D′) = ym | Q˜j(D′) = yj
]
= ln
1√
2π(σm2−r2σj2)
e
− gm
2
2(σm2−r2σj
2)
1√
2π(σm2−r2σj2)
e
−
(gm+hm−rhj)
2
2(σm2−r2σj
2)
=
(gm + hm − rhj)2 − gm2
2(σm2 − r2σj2)
=
gm(hm − rhj)
σm2 − r2σj2 +
(hm − rhj)2
2(σm2 − r2σj2) . (17)
Since gm follows a zero-mean Gaussian distribution with
variance σm
2−r2σj2, clearly gm(hm−rhj)σm2−r2σj2 follows a zero-mean
Gaussian distribution with variance given by[
(hm − rhj)
σm2 − r2σj2
]2
× (σm2 − r2σj2)
=
(hm − rhj)2
σm2 − r2σj2 . (18)
Since Qm and Qj are the same, we obtain from Eq. (11)
and Eq. (12) that hj = hm = Qm(D) − Qm(D′), which we
use to write Eq. (18) as
[‖Qm(D)−Qm(D′)‖2]2(1− r)2
σm2 − r2σj2 . (19)
Summarizing the above, privacy loss is
Br(D,D
′) := A(D,D′) +
[‖Qm(D)−Qm(D′)‖2]2(1− r)2
σm2 − r2σj2 .
(20)
(ii) The optimal r is obtained by minimizing Br(D,D
′) and
hence minimizing
(1−r)2
σm2−r2σj2
. Analyzing the monotonicity of
this expression, we derive the optimal r as in Eq. (4). The
first-order derivative of Br(D,D
′) to r is:
Br(D,D
′)′ =
−2(rσj2 − σm2)(r − 1)
(r2σj2 − σm2)2 . (21)
• Case 1: if σm ≥ σj , Br(D,D′)′ ≥ 0 when r ∈ [1, σmσj ], and
Br(D,D
′)′ < 0 when r ∈ (−∞, 1) ∪ (σm
σj
,+∞). Hence, the
optimal r to minimize Br(D,D
′) is at r = 1.
• Case 2: if σm < σj , Br(D,D′)′ ≥ 0 when r ∈ [σmσj , 1], and
Br(D,D
′)′ < 0 when r ∈ (−∞, σm
σj
) ∪ (1,+∞). Hence, the
optimal r to minimize Br(D,D
′) is at r = (σm
σj
)2.
Thus, we obtain optimal values of r as Eq. (4).
B. Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Consider a query R with ℓ2-sensitivity being 1.
Let R˜ be the mechanism of adding Gaussian noise
amount µ := 1√
max
neighboring datasets D,D′
V (D,D′)
to R. From
Corollary 1, the privacy loss of randomized mecha-
nism R˜ with respect to neighboring datasets D and
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D′ is given by N (U(D,D′)2 , U(D,D′)) for U(D,D′) :=
[‖R(D)−R(D′)‖2]
2
µ2
. By considering the ℓ2-sensitivity of R (i.e.,
‖R(D) − R(D′)‖2) as 1, maxneighboring datasets D,D′ V (D,D′)
and maxneighboring datasets D,D′ U(D,D
′) are the same. In
addition, from Theorem 5 of [41], letting Y (resp.,
R˜) satisfy (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy can be converted to
a condition on maxneighboring datasets D,D′ V (D,D
′) (resp.,
maxneighboring datasets D,D′ U(D,D
′)). Then letting Y satisfy
(ǫ, δ)-differential privacy is the same as letting R˜ satisfy
(ǫ, δ)-differential privacy. From Lemma 1, R˜ achieves (ǫ, δ)-
differential privacy with µ = Gaussian(1, ǫ, δ); i.e., if
maxneighboring datasets D,D′ V (D,D
′) = [Gaussian(1, ǫ, δ)]−2.
Summarizing the above, we complete proving Lemma 2.
C. Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. We use Theorem 1 to show Results ① ② and ③ of
Theorem 2. Proof of ①: In Case 2A) and Case 2C), Qm
can reuse previous noise. Hence, the privacy loss will still be
N (A(D,D′)2 , A(D,D′)) according to Eq. (5).
Proof of ②: In Case 1), Qm cannot reuse previous
noisy answers, and the new noise follows N (0, σm). Thus,
B(D,D′) := A(D,D′) + [‖Qm(D)−Qm(D
′)‖2]
2
σm2
.
Proof of ③: In Case 2B), Qm can reuse previous noisy answers
partially, so we can prove it using Eq. (5).
Then, Lemma 2 further implies Results ④ ⑤ and ⑥ of
Theorem 2.
Proof of ④: Qm can fully reuse the old noisy result in
Cases 2A) and 2C). Thus, the privacy level does not change.
Proof of ⑤: From Lemma 2, we
have maxneighboring datasets D,D′ A(D,D
′) =
[Gaussian(1, ǫold, δbudget)]
−2 and
maxneighboring datasets D,D′
{
A(D,D′)+[‖Qm(D)−Qm(D′)‖2]2
× 1
σm2
}
= [Gaussian(1, ǫnew, δbudget)]
−2.
The above two equations yield
[Gaussian(1, ǫnew, δbudget)]
−2 − [Gaussian(1, ǫold, δbudget)]−2
= maxneighboring datasets D,D′ [‖Qm(D) − Qm(D′)‖2]2 ×
1
σm2
= ∆Qm
2 × 1
σm2
= σm
2. Hence,
Gaussian(∆Qm ,ǫ squared cost,δbugdet) = σm.
Proof of ⑥: From Lemma 2, we
have maxneighboring datasets D,D′ A(D,D
′) =
[Gaussian(1, ǫold, δbudget)]
−2 and
maxneighboring datasets D,D′
{
A(D,D′)+[‖Qm(D)−Qm(D′)‖2]2
×
[
1
σm2
− 1[min(Σt)]2
]}
= [Gaussian(1, ǫnew, δbudget)]
−2.
The above two equations yield
[Gaussian(1, ǫnew, δbudget)]
−2 − [Gaussian(1, ǫold, δbudget)]−2
= maxneighboring datasets D,D′ [‖Qm(D) − Qm(D′)‖2]2 ×[
1
σm2
− 1[min(Σt)]2
]
= ∆Qm
2 ×
[
1
σm2
− 1[min(Σt)]2
]
. Then
using the expression of Gaussian(∆Q, ǫ, δ) from Lemma 1,
we further obtain Result ⑥.
D. Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. First, from Theorem 2, after Algorithm 1 is used to an-
swer all n queries with query Qi being answered under (ǫi, δi)-
differential privacy, the total privacy loss with respect to neigh-
boring datasets D and D′ is given by N (G(D,D′)2 , G(D,D′))
for some G(D,D′).
Next, we use Theorem 2 to further show that the expression
of G(D,D′) is given by Eq. (6). From Theorem 2, among all
queries, only queries belonging to Cases 1) and 2B) contribute
to G(D,D′). Below we discuss the contributions respectively.
With N1 denoting the set of i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} such that Qi
is in Cases 1), we know from Result ② of Theorem 2 that the
contributions of queries in Cases 1) to G(D,D′) is given by∑
i∈N1
[‖Qi(D)−Qi(D′)‖2]2
σi2
. (22)
Below we use Result ③ of Theorem 2 to compute the
contributions of queries in Case 2B) to G(D,D′). For T2B
being the set of query types in Case 2B), we discuss each
query type t ∈ T2B respectively.
From Result ③ of Theorem 2, the contribution to G(D,D′)
by answering Qjt,1 under differential privacy is
[‖Qjt,1(D)−Qjt,1(D′)‖2]2
(
1
σ2jt,1
− 1
σ2jt,0
)
.
Similarly, the contribution to G(D,D′) by answering Qjt,2
under differential privacy is
[‖Qjt,2(D)−Qjt,2(D′)‖2]2
(
1
σ2jt,2
− 1
σ2jt,1
)
.
Similar analyses are repeated for additional type-t queries in
Case 2B). In particular, for each s ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,mt}, the
contribution to G(D,D′) by answering Qjt,s under differential
privacy is
[‖Qjt,s(D)−Qjt,s(D′)‖2]2
(
1
σ2jt,s
− 1
σ2jt,s−1
)
. (23)
Summing all (23) for s ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,mt}, we obtain that for
each query type t ∈ T2B , the contributions to G(D,D′) by
answering Qjt,1 , Qjt,2 , . . . , Qjt,mt under differential privacy is∑
s∈{1,2,...,mt}
[‖Qjt,s(D) −Qjt,s(D′)‖2]2
(
1
σ2jt,s
− 1
σ2jt,s−1
)
.
(24)
Since Qjt,0 , Qjt,1 , . . . , Qjt,mt for jt,0, jt,1, . . . , jt,mt are all
type-t queries, ‖Qjt,s(D) − Qjt,s(D′)‖2 are all the same for
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s ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,mt}. Hence, we write (24) as∑
s∈{1,2,...,mt}
{
[‖Qjt,s(D)−Qjt,s(D′)‖2]2
σ2jt,s
− [‖Qjt,s−1(D)−Qjt,s−1(D
′)‖2]2
σ2jt,s−1
}
=
[‖Qjt,mt (D)−Qjt,mt (D′)‖2]
2
σ2jt,mt
− [‖Qjt,0(D)−Qjt,0(D
′)‖2]2
σ2jt,0
. (25)
Summing all (25) for t ∈ T2B , the contributions to G(D,D′)
by answering all queries in Case 2B) is∑
t∈T2B
{
[‖Qjt,mt (D)−Qjt,mt (D′)‖2]2
σ2jt,mt
− [‖Qjt,0(D)−Qjt,0(D
′)‖2]2
σ2jt,0
}
. (26)
Then G(D,D′) as the sum of (22) and (26) is given by Eq. (6).
Summarizing the above, we have proved that after Algo-
rithm 1 is used to answer all n queries under differential
privacy, the total privacy loss with respect to neighboring
datasets D and D′ is given by N (G(D,D′)2 , G(D,D′)) for
G(D,D′) in Eq. (6). Furthermore, under
max
neighboring datasets D,D′
‖Qi(D)−Qi(D′)‖2 = ∆Qi
and
max
neighboring datasets D,D′
‖Qjt,mt (D)−Qjt,mt (D′)‖2
= max
neighboring datasets D,D′
‖Qjt,0(D)−Qjt,0(D′)‖2 = ∆(type-t),
we use Eq. (6) to have maxneighboring datasets D,D′ G(D,D
′)
given by Eq. (7).
Finally, from Lemma 2, the total privacy cost of our Algo-
rithm 1 can be given by (ǫours, δbudget)-differential privacy for
ǫours satisfying
[Gaussian(1, ǫours, δbudget)]
−2 = max
neighboring datasets D,D′
G(D,D′).
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